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24 March 1965

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary Vance, 24 March 1965**


1. By arrangement with Mr. Vance, I called on him at his office shortly before 1400 hours and handed him a copy of the memorandum containing the proposed organizational arrangement for the NRO. I said that in the light of my conversations with him and Dr. Fubini, it had seemed desirable to restate the basic assumptions on which we were proceeding and which we were trying to accommodate, and also to identify the various alternatives which appeared to suggest themselves as possible arrangements to provide for the administration of the NRP. I said that the arrangement which we were proposing was not an ideal arrangement in the conventional sense. It does not eliminate the possibility of friction which is inherent in any arrangement calling for the integrated effort of two or more Government agencies and a large number of private contractors. On the other hand, I said that Mr. McCone was satisfied that this was not only the best organizational arrangement which we could devise, but was also convinced that with a reasonable amount of good will and under intelligent supervision it would work.

2. Mr. Vance then handed me a copy of a memorandum from Dr. McMillan relating to the current dispute over access to data requested by General Greer to correlate the telemetry from CORONA space flights. Mr. Vance said that he had hoped that Dr. McMillan and General Carter would be able to resolve this problem which seemed to him to involve a simple question of exchange of information. He professed to be deeply disturbed at the fact that this question could not be resolved and said that it was shocking to him to realize that any element of the Government would withhold information from another element of the Government which was charged with responsibility for the conduct of a program and which needed that information

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to discharge the responsibility. I said that the problem was pretty complicated. I said that I could fully understand the argument that General Greer should have access to any information relating to his responsibility for inflight control of the system. I said, however, that as a practical matter, I doubted very much whether General Greer would be able to understand this information if he had it. In order to make use of it, I said that I supposed that the CIA technicians

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 (who presently receive and use this data) would have to be transferred to Vandenberg to interpret it for General Greer and that this, from the bureaucratic point of view, was what the argument was all about. I said that the CIA, rightly or wrongly -- but I felt sincerely, believed the transfer of the responsibility for receiving and evaluating the data in question represented the last vestige of individual control exercised by CIA over this program. I said that if this specific question could be reviewed in the context of an organization such as the one proposed, which is designed to secure CIA a fair measure of participation in the program as a whole, that the attitude would be quite different. Until a decision has been made, however, either assuring CIA general participation in the program or eliminating it from the reconnaissance program entirely, CIA did not want to abdicate its position voluntarily.

3. Mr. Vance was preparing for an appearance before Congress and at this moment Dr. Brown came in with some briefing material, so I left with the assurance that I would be glad to come back at any time and talk further.

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

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